Introduction
The Information Technology (IT) centric focus of the 2002 E-Government Act was appropriate at that time and highlighted the importance of information security and privacy [1] .
Since then, wireless communication and Critical Infrastructure (CI) control technologies have changed considerably and egovernment connectivity now exists well below the IT internet backbone. Although remaining IT-centric, the US government has more recently acknowledged the importance of addressing "rapidly evolving and persistent cyber threats" [2] . Perhaps of greatest concern from a protection perspective is that the cyber threat and attack surface increases as government-tointernet connectivity (exposure) increases through supporting sub-internet pathways comprised of wireless WiFi, Z-Wave, and Bluetooth devices.
Cyber physical systems (CPS) include Wireless Personal Area Network (WPAN) devices supporting the Internet of Things (IoT) and CI systems [3] , [4] , [5] . Low-cost, low-power Z-Wave devices are among the sub-internet WPAN support technologies that enable mesh networks comprised of smart devices [6] , [7] . These networks support data collection and control [8] via Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems [9] . Mesh networks are used, for instance, in hospital [10] and electrical smartgrid [11] applications, both of which are CI elements within e-government and private sectors. Of particular risk in WPAN applications is that a security compromise of one device can threaten the security of the entire network. Thus, vetting of individual ZWave device identities is critical for ensuring robust security. This criticality extends beyond CI, with egovernment CPS applications including interactive public displays and urban intervention systems (participatory and interactive) that relay information of interest to the public [12] .
Of interest here are CPS implementations using ZWave WPAN devices that 1) lack robust security and 2) which are readily exploitable (hackable) [13] , [14] . Device hardware ID and operating state discrimination for CI security applications has been reliably demonstrated using Physical (PHY) layer security enhancement [4] , [9] , [15] . As discussed in [16] , PHY layer security involves either 1) adding physically traceable objects to devices [17] or 2) Radio Frequency Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) fingerprinting based on PHY device emissions which overcome limitations of encryption key-based measures [18] . RF-DNA differs from typical WPAN defense and security strategies that target higher bitlevel network layers [19] , i.e., the Network (NWK) and Media Access Control (MAC) layers [20] . Using underutilized PHY information [18] with NWK and MAC information yields a more robust biometric-like wireless security strategy that includes [18] , [21] :
1. "Something you know" (NWK -encryption keys) 2. "Something you have" (MAC -MAC address) 3. "Something you are" (PHY -RF Fingerprints). The inclusion of PHY-based information is most important given that replication of known bit-level ID credentials is relative easy and enables unauthorized network access [21] . The device dependent PHY features capture intrinsic device differences resulting from component and production variation [21] and are nearly impossible to replicate. The degree of device discrimination is captured through statistical methods of feature extraction, device classification (one vs. many), and device ID verification (one vs. one) [21] [22]. Discrimination is assessed using 1) an eigenspace based Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) classifier, and 2) a nonlinear Generalized Relevance Learning Vector Quantization-Improved (GRLVQI) neural network based classifier [23] .
Prior research considered GRLVQI for Z-Wave devices [21] but used empirical parameter settings derived from related ZigBee work [23] . Given that algorithmic settings directly impact LVQ performance [24] , with setting determination being a balance between science and art with "no hard-and-fast rules" [25] , the focus here was on optimizing GRLVQI settings for Z-Wave. This was done using a 5-factor full factorial experimental design and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), methods commonly used for industrial process improvement [26] . Optimal settings were determined using both a spreadsheet search [27] and Response Surface Methodology (RSM) [28] , [29] , [30] , [31] with nonlinear optimization [32] . The experimental design assessment was aided by introducing two performance measures, including: 1) Relative Accuracy Percentage (RAP) for classification, and 2) Mean Area Under the Curve (AUC M ) for device ID verification.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a summary of Z-Wave devices, RF-DNA Fingerprinting, and the MDA and GRLVQI classifiers. Section 3 addresses ANOVA, RSM and RAP and AUC M performance measure development. Section 4 presents performance results and Section 5 concludes the paper.
RF-DNA and Z-Wave
Z-Wave wireless communication devices are small, low-cost hardware devices and are generally considered less secure than competing WPAN technologies given 1) originally lacked built in encryption [33] and 2) the proprietary nature of the standard making it difficult for third parties to provide enhancements [34] . Z-Wave follows a similar ISO architecture to ZigBee, and similarly has a predefined preamble and Start of Frame (SoF) [35] . General ZWave signal characteristics are known and presented in Table 1 along with a conceptualization of Z-Wave PHY packet structure in Figure 1 . The preamble response (the first 8.3 ms of Z-Wave bursts) was considered the Region Of Interest (ROI) for RF-DNA extraction. Z-Wave also includes a payload-based home identification (32-bits) and source identification (8-bits) [34] . Due to their proprietary nature, further knowledge of Z-Wave signal characteristics is limited and thus digital forensic analysis, c.f. [36] , [37] , of ZWave devices remains an emerging area of interest [38] . 
Z-Wave Signal Collection
The work herein considered the Z-Wave dataset first presented in [21] , where N D = 3 Aeotec Z-Stick S2 transmitter devices were considered for analysis with all devices serving in "authorized" roles. A total of 230 preamble responses were collected for each device at a sample frequency of f s = 2 Msps. Burst detection was accomplished using an amplitude-based leading edge detector with a -6 dB threshold [21] . For signal collection, each Z-Stick transmitter was located 10 cm from a vertically-oriented LP0410 log periodic antenna, which was connected via a Gigabit Ethernet cable directly to the USRP-2921 RF input [21] . The resultant collected Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) was at SNR C = 24.0 dB. Independent, like-filtered Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) was added to collected signals to achieve desired operating conditions of SNR  [0 24.0] dB [21] , [22] .
RF-DNA Fingerprint Generation
Consistent with [21] , N S = 3 RF-DNA fingerprint features (statistics) of variance ( 2 ), skewness ( ), and kurtosis ( ) were computed for N R = 20 subregions spanning the ROI within N C = 3 Z-Wave instantaneous time domain responses of amplitude ( ), phase ( ), and frequency ( ). RF-DNA fingerprints were generated, as in [21] , [22] , by 1) dividing each response into N R contiguous equal length bins, 2) calculating N s features within each bin and across the entire response (N R + 1 total bins), and 3) computing regional fingerprint vectors as,
where = 1,2, … , + 1. A fingerprint vector for each of the N C characteristics is formed from (1) as,
, (2) which are concatenated to form the final fingerprint vector:
For Z-Wave device discrimination assessments, a total of N F = 189 features are computed with N TRN = 115 Training (TNG) and N TST = 115 Testing (TST) observations per device. The TNG and TST data was sequestered during model development to avoid the possibility of overfitting.
Classifier Models
2.3.1. GRLVQI Classifier Model. The GRLVQI classifier employed herein is based on the work in [21] , [23] . GRLVQI extends the squared-Euclidean distance based gradient descent process of Learning Vector Quantization (LVQ) with embellishments of a sigmoidal cost function [39] , [40] , relevance learning [41] , [42] , and conscience learning [25] , [43] , which are employed to train prototype vectors to a given class label [21] , [23] . GRLVQI extends GRLVQ [42] with the conscience learning of DeSieno [44] , improved PV update logic, and a frequency based maximum input update strategy [25] .
As with LVQ and various embellishments, GRLVQI has five different factors to consider: 1) Factor A, gradient descent learning rate ( ), 2) Factor B, relevance learning rate ( ), 3) Factor C, conscience rate 1 ( ), 4) Factor D, conscience rate 2 ( ), and 5) Factor E), the number of prototype vectors (N PV ) instantiated per class. For all devices used herein, prior probabilities were considered equal between devices, with the update logic and GRLVQI classifier model as described in [18] , [23] .
Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA).
MDA is both readily interpretable and is computationally inexpensive. Furthermore, MDA has shown significant performance advantages over GRLVQI for many RF-DNA Fingerprinting problems and it is thus included to provide a baseline performance reference, consistent with [23] . MDA is a multi-class extension of Fisher's two class linear classifier [23] . MDA considers input fingerprint matrix F and N C classes and involves an eigenvectorbased projection of the data relative to a ratio of between-group to within-group sum-of-squares, the Fisher criterion [45] .
Quantifying Classification Performance
Classification is considered for "one vs. many" scenarios as in [21] , [22] . Two performance measures are considered: 1) SNR (dB) "Gain" (G SNR ) defined as the reduction in SNR for two methods to achieve a given average percent correct classification (%C) [23] , and 2) Relative Average Percentage (RAP). Both G SNR and RAP measures consider figures with %C on the y-axis and SNR (dB) on the xaxis, as seen in Figure 2 for both training (TNG) and testing (TST) performance of MDA and GRLVQI using the Z-Wave dataset. 
SNR Gain.
G SNR is computed for authorized device TNG and TST datasets [23] . For results herein, performance using the full dimensional (N F = 189) baseline feature set serves as the reference with an arbitrary %C ≥ 90% benchmark as in [21] , [23] . G SNR is interpreted as: 1) G SNR < 0.0 (negative), a given method achieves the same %C as the baseline at a higher SNR, i.e. the method underperforms the baseline method.
2) G SNR = 0.0, a given method achieves the same %C as the baseline at the same SNR 3) G SNR > 0.0 (positive), a given method achieves the same %C as the baseline at a lower SNR, i.e. the method outperforms the baseline method. For Z-Wave results in Figure 2 at %C = 90%, GRLVQI outperforms MDA with G SNR = +3.32 dB (TST) and G SNR = +3.72 dB (TNG). Therefore, when considering classification performance, GRLVQI is a superior classifier for Z-Wave relative to MDA.
Relative Accuracy Percentage (RAP).
In cases where %C ≥ 90% is not achieved, G SNR is not computable and is thus insufficient for some complete analysis. Since determining algorithmic settings by examining possible setting combinations is of interest herein, the possible lack of G SNR can introduce instabilities and the RAP measure was introduced herein as an alternative measure.
RAP is generated by 1) computing the Area Under Classification Curve (AUCC) values for each method via a trapezoidal approximation, and 2) computing the RAP of a given method's ( ) relative to the baseline AUCC Base method according to Table 2 presents overall results for the Z-Wave data for both MDA and GRLVQI using AUCC, RAP and Gain. Overall, Table 2 shows that GRLVQI performs consistently better across all operating points when compared to MDA for Z-Wave. 
Classification Performance Results

Quantifying Verification Performance
Device ID verification is considered in a "one versus one" (claimed vs actual) ID assessment. Here, a trained classifier is considered along with probability mass functions (PMFs) for authorized devices [46] . Computed for ID verification are True Verification Rate (TVR) and False Verification Rate (FVR) for the y-axis and x-axis, respectively, of authorized device Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves [46] . Two measures are considered herein to quantify verification performance: percent authorized [21] , [22] , and mean AUC (AUC M ).
Percentage Authorized (%Aut).
Consistent with [21] , [22] , ID verification performance is commonly evaluated by a percentage correctly authorized from a binary grant/deny network access decisions based on a verification criteria, e.g. TVR ≥ 90% at FVR ≤ 10%. Figure 3 presents analysis based on this threshold (denoted by dashed red lines) for GRLVQI at SNR = 20 dB, with solid black lines indicate successfully achieving this threshold and dashed grey lines indicate a failure to achieve this threshold. Overall results in Figure 3 show %Aut = 1/3 = 33.33% success. 
Verification Mean AUC (AUC M ).
Percentage authorized (%Aut) reflects coarse sampling, e.g. N D = 3 devices %Aut  [0, 33, 66, 100], and does not distinguish between perfectly verified results (a ROC Area Under the Curve (AUC) of AUC = 1.0) and results that merely achieve the TVR > 90% at FVR < 10%. Therefore, AUC M is proposed as an alternative verification performance measure. This involves computing the AUC for each ROC curve, one curve is associated with one device, and then computing the mean of all curves considered. Table 3 presents verification results via %Aut, AUC and AUC M at SNR = [18, 20, 22] dB; further verification results will only be considered herein for SNR = 20dB (the SNR at which GRLVQI achieves %C = 90%). As seen in the %Aut column Table 3 , the %Aut rate involves dichotomization, c.f. [47] , whereby the continuous response of the ROC curve is made discrete, which introduces issues related to resolution, c.f. [48] , [49] , [50] , and optimization of a dichotomous response variable is nontrivial, c.f. [51] , [52] . When examining the continuous AUC values, one can notice slight differences and thus optimization relative to a continuous variable is preferred. 
Verification Performance Results
Analysis of Variance and GRLVQI Optimization Considerations
Due to the small size of the Z-Wave dataset, it is intuitive that linear methods (MDA) underperform nonlinear methods (GRLVQI). However, determining appropriate settings is critically important for Z-Wave analysis via GRLVQI since this data is associated with unknown operating characteristics. However, determining appropriate LVQ algorithm settings is a largely unexplored domain; herein, a second-order RSM model will be considered to solve for optimal algorithmic settings where the target are the dependent variables (RAP or AUC M ).
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
General linear models, e.g. ANOVA and linear regression, work to understanding variability of data through sums of squares [28] . Factorial experiments consider all combinations of different factors and levels to understand significance of factors relative to the response and the interaction of factors [28] . Herein, a factorial experiment for the 5 GRLVQI algorithmic settings is proposed, ANOVA responses will be considered as RAP TNG , RAP TST and AUC M .
Response Surface Methodology (RSM)
RSM extends ANOVA by considering an ANOVA model with both squared terms and two-way interactions:
where represents the number of factors, terms are coefficients solved for via a general linear model, and x represents a given factor [53] .
GRLVQI Algorithmic Settings
To consider a full factorial model, appropriate minimum and maximum values for GRLVQI algorithmic settings must be developed. However, little has been published about LVQ algorithmic settings beyond 1) the general hierarchy of 0 ≤ ( ) ≤ ( ) ≤ 1 for relevance-based LVQ methods [54] , 2) specific guidelines for specific applications, e.g. [55] , [56] , and 3) learning rate convergence methods, e.g. [55] .
Additionally, appropriately specifying N PV is also critical to avoid overfitting and/or poor performance [57] .
A few considerations were made in determining ranges for appropriate settings. The operational design points for each factor appear in Table 4 where the baseline settings, coded as "0", are baseline GRLVQI settings used by [23] , [58] . The high (+) and low (-) settings in Table 4 were determined by 1) taking magnitudes of 10 times above (+) and below (-) the learning (Factor A) and relevance (Factor B) rates, 2) conscience rate limits were determined by considering the extreme settings explored in [59] , and 3) PV limits were found by going 30% above and below the baseline. 
GRLVQI Optimization Framework
Results were generated using GRLVQI with THE Z-Wave datasets for all 3 5 = 243 combinations of a full factorial design using values in Table 4 . To determine optimal settings, two approaches were considered: 1) a spreadsheet search of the full factorial results to find the maximum classification and verification performance and 2) employing nonlinear optimization methods to find potential optimal settings within the full factorial settings. Sequestered TST data was used to validate the settings in a process similar to that of [60] .
Spreadsheet Search
A spreadsheet search, consistent with [27] , was performed to find the highest performing results, and resultant settings, from the experimental design. The highest performing results were found for: 1) TNG results, 2) TST results, and 3) AUC M results. When considering TNG results, the highest performance was found with Factor A, Factor B, and Factor C at the highest setting, Factor D at its mid-range setting, and Factor E its lowest setting. For TST results, the highest performance was found with Factor A and Factor C at their highest settings, Factor B at its midrange setting, and Factor D and Factor E at their lowest settings. For verification AUC M results, the highest performance was found with Factor A and Factor B at their highest settings, Factor C and Factor D at mid-range settings, and Factor E at its lowest setting.
Constrained Nonlinear Optimization
One limitation of the spreadsheet search is that it only finds best results in explored combinations. To find optimal algorithmic settings within the design space, the full factorial results were considered with RSM. First, an ANOVA model was computed for classification (RAP TST and RAP TNG ) and verification (AUC M ). Next, the statistically significant (α = 10) features were selected and a second ANOVA model, with only the selected factors, was then created. The second ANOVA model was optimized consistent with [32] ; the optimization process employed constrained nonlinear optimization (interior point optimization), consistent with [61] , and the results provided optimal GRLVQI settings. Table 5 presents  the ANOVA table for Table 4 , these are easily recomputed due to the underlying relationships: 1) each main effect and each interaction has one DoF each, 2) Mean Squares (MS) for a factor are MS Factor = SoS / DoF, and 3) factor F 0 is computed as F 0 = MS Factor / MS Error [28] .
ANOVA and RSM Results.
Sequential Quadratic Programming (SQP).
A majority voting approach was applied to the ANOVA models in Table 5 to determine which features to consider for further analysis. Thus, features that were on majority statistically significant (dark or light gray shading) were retained and further ANOVA models were computed. Constrained minimization (target values were negated since maximization is possible by minimizing a negation) was considered where a finite-difference approximation was computed by starting with an initial estimate (the baseline GRLVQI settings). The relationship between variables was optimized via SQP wherein a line search was employed [61] .
The minimization was constrained between the minimum and maximum values seen in Table 4 ). The optimal solution was then computed for each factor level with the resultant optimal algorithmic settings for each factor are presented in Table 6 along with performance results. Optimization was considered individually for maximum RAP TST , RAP TNG , and AUC M . Of note, some optimization solutions had results that were identical to lower or upper bounds, denoted with + or -; otherwise, the resultant uncoded setting is presented. Evident in Table 6 is that both classification and verification performance improve with the spreadsheet search and optimized settings when compared to baseline GRLVQI settings. Consistency across results indicates that using too many PVs is detrimental to performance, logically this could facilitate over-fitting, and thus the LVQ architecture does not need to be too cumbersome. Although TVR = 100% for MDA, overall AUC M is consistent between MDA and GRLVQI optimized results.
Summary and Conclusions
From an e-government cyber security and protection perspective, sub-internet pathways that are comprised of common wireless WiFi, Z-Wave and Bluetooth devices increase the cyber attack surface and risk of service degradation or disruption. Risk mitigation is a top priority when considering that hospital, electrical power grid and other CI systems are vulnerable. The focus here is on demonstrating measures to enhanced Z-Wave security, with results being generally applicable to other WPANs.
There are four contributions for improving ZWave device discrimination using RF-DNA Fingerprints, including: 1) introduction of RAP and AUC M performance measures, 2) formalization of a DOE approach for classifier model development, 3) demonstration of a GRLVQI optimization framework for classification and verification, and 4) a GRLVQI and MDA/ML comparative assessment for Z-Wave PHY device identification.
Herein, a process was presented to find optimal algorithm settings by first performing a designed experiment (full factorial) and then employing both a spreadsheet search and nonlinear optimization. The results collectively illustrate that 1) determining appropriate GRLVQI algorithm settings is critical (the optimized learning rates differed by no more than 5% yet produced larger variations in RAP and AUC M ), and 2) the viability of DOE methods for RF-DNA Fingerprinting algorithm optimization. 
